

STATEMENT

THE CLAIMS OF THE CITY OF MONTREAL,

TO BE SELECTED AS

THE FUTURE CAPITAL

OF

CANADA.



MONTREAL :

PRINTED BY JAMES STARKE & CO.

No. 59 Saint-François Xavier Street.

1857.

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CITY HALL,
MONTREAL, 27th May, 1857.

To the
Right Honorable the Secretary of State,
FOR THE COLONIES,
London.

RIGHT HONORABLE SIR,

The Circular of which the following is a Copy
was received by me, as Mayor of the City, last month.

Circular.

GOVERNOR'S SECRETARY'S OFFICE.
TORONTO, C.W., March 28th, 1857.

SIR,

You are probably aware that the Legislative
Council and Legislative Assembly of Canada have addressed Her
Most Gracious Majesty, to exercise her prerogative in the selection
of a permanent Seat of Government for the whole Province.

In the event of Her Majesty complying with the prayer of
these addresses, His Excellency is anxious that Her advisers in
England should be enabled to place before Her, a fair and full
statement of the claims of each separate City, which may be
considered a candidate for the honor of becoming the future
Capital of Canada. As a matter of course the final solution
must depend on a comprehensive survey of the interests, not of
any place, but of the whole Province, as part of British North
America.

The claims, however, of each City are likely to be stated, by the persons most interested in supporting them, better than they would be by any other party.

His Excellency, therefore, invites the Corporation of Montreal to cause to be prepared a paper setting forth the reasons which may, in their opinion, favor the claim of that place to be selected by the Queen.

With every wish to afford full time for preparing these statements, His Excellency desires that it may be in the hands of the Colonial Secretary by the first week of July in the present year.

You will please, if you see fit to comply with His Excellency's desire, to address the packet to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, and endorse it with the words "City of Montreal, Canada."

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

R. T. PENNEFATHER.

His Worship the Mayor of Montreal.

The confidence which the Citizens of Montreal have ever entertained in the wisdom and justice of Her Most Gracious Majesty, and their knowledge of Her Gracious consideration and regard for all Her Canadian subjects, would have withheld the City Government of Montreal, from submitting the reasons which they confidently believe will induce Her Most Gracious Majesty, on a comprehensive survey of the interests, not of any particular locality, but of the whole Province, to select the City of Montreal,

as the future permanent Seat of Government for United Canada ; but respect for the wishes of Her Majesty's Representative, expressed in the foregoing circular, now demands that some, at least, of these reasons should be stated.

The present is not the first occasion on which the important question has been mooted, of the locality in which the Seat of Government should be permanently established in Canada. It was discussed, and decided upon, by the Provincial Legislature, in the year 1843, when the Government was temporarily located in Kingston.

The reasons which induced the Legislature, at that time, to decide upon fixing the Seat of Government permanently in Montreal, are embodied in the Report of a Committee of the Executive Council, to His Excellency the RIGHT HONORABLE SIR CHARLES BAGOT, then Governor General of British North America. This Report was drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee, the late Honorable Mr. Sullivan, an Upper Canadian Member of the Legislature, who was born, and resided all his lifetime, in Toronto, and who was for many years the popular representative of that City, in the Legislative Assembly of the Province. All the other Members of the Committee by whom the Report was adopted, with the exception of two—Messieurs Lafontaine and Morin—were Upper Canadian Members, resident in, and representing Constituencies in that section of the Province. Such men could not have been charged, on such a question, with indifference to the claims of any section of Upper Canada, or with partiality or bias for the City of Montreal. The reasons given in the Report apply with even greater force and weight at present, than they did then ; they so obviously proceed from a comprehensive survey of the interests of the whole Province, and not from partial or corrupt feelings for any particular locality ; they are so cogent and conclusive ; and they are, moreover, so clearly and impartially stated, that no excuse will be offered for their reproduction here.

REPORT.

Extracted from the printed Journals of the Legislative Council of the Province of Canada, third Session of the first Provincial Parliament, 1843, vol. 3, p. 156 :—

(COPY.)

To His Excellency the RIGHT HONORABLE SIR CHARLES BAGOT,
G. C. B., Governor General of British North America, &c.

REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

*Present :—*The Hon. Mr. Sullivan in the Chair, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Daly, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Killaly, Mr. Hincks, Mr. Lafontaine, Mr. Baldwin, and Mr. Morin, relative to the Seat of Government; Messrs. Aylwin and Small being absent on public business.

May it please your Excellency :—

The important question, respecting the locality of the Seat of the Provincial Government of Canada, upon which your Excellency is desired by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, to form an opinion, with the assistance of the Executive Council, has engaged the anxious attention of the Committee of the whole of that body, and the Committee, fully sensible of the difficulties attending such a subject of enquiry, and aware of the impossibility of reconciling local interests in favor of any decision which may be pronounced, respectfully offer their advice, the result of much deliberation, and which, though not in accordance with the first impression on the mind of the late Governor General, or with the policy which directed the assemblage of the Legislature at Kingston, and the removal of the Public Departments to that place, they believe, nevertheless, to be most conducive to the public welfare and most likely to meet with the general approbation of the people of the Province.

As might naturally be expected, the popular opinions most strongly expressed are either openly based upon the claims of the inhabitants of certain localities, to have the Seat of Government in their own city or neighbourhood, or they are traceable to

local pecuniary interest, though assuming the appearance of taking public and general ground. Thus for example, the Citizens of the ancient Capitals of Upper and Lower Canada complain of depreciation in the value of property consequent upon the removal of the Government from these cities. The inhabitants of Kingston set up a like claim because of their late investment of capital in building, and in the purchase of building ground under the expectation formed by them that Kingston was to be the permanent capital. Then on behalf of Quebec, its Military strength and its possession of buildings for the use of the Legislature are said to give that city the preference, on the arguments of security and economy. The existence of Public Buildings in Toronto, the rapidly increasing population and wealth of that city and the neighbouring districts are urged as public grounds of economy and future convenience in its favor, while in Kingston its central position and defences, and the expenditure that lately took place under the authority of Lord Sydenham, in the purchase of lands for the erection of Public Buildings, are brought forward not only as inducements for making Kingston the Provincial Capital, but as in a manner binding on Her Majesty's Government to fulfill expectations to which the Acts of Government gave rise. Then in favor of Bytown, its inland position, on the boundary river between the late Provinces, and at the mouth of the great military canal of the Rideau, are said to give it claims to consideration above other places, because it is comparatively safe in case of war, and convenient alike for Upper and Lower Canadians.

The Committee look upon the selection of a locality for the Government and Legislature, as far too important to the public generally, to permit of much consideration of the local interests of the inhabitants of the places claiming to be chosen. The convenience and advantage of the whole community are mainly to be sought, and it may be said that these are the sole objects to be served in the selection of a Capital in a country like Canada, where as yet no great local interests are created of sufficient importance to entitle them to regard in a national point of view. The removal of a Government is unquestionably a great calamity to the possessors of property in the place from which the removal is made, and measures of change in this respect should never be lightly adopted; but these facts only make it more imperatively the duty of the Government to be careful in the choice, and at the earliest possible period to fix the Capital at a place from which the future condition of the country will

not require a removal. To continue for a time any Seat of Government injudiciously chosen, exposes the place to the aggravated but certain future evil of abandonment when the interest involved would be vastly greater than at present, and therefore while the Government is bound to avoid as much as possible, changes in the location of a Capital, this desirable object can only be attained by correct selection made in contemplation not of local or temporary but of general abiding interests.

The Union of the Provinces of Canada brings together in one Legislature and in one city, those interested with the management of public affairs of a people scattered over an extensive region, and differing in language, in laws, and in many respects, in local interests. It also brings to the Seat of the Provincial Government a continual concourse of persons having private or public matters to solicit. To cause this assemblage in any portion of one Section of the Province which from its position, would place the Legislature and suitors from the other section at once out of view of everything connected with their own race and country, and at a distance from those whose interests they are bound to represent, and whose confidence it is essential for them to continue, would, in the opinion of the Committee of Council, prove a never ceasing source of discontent, and would promote a sense of banishment and of abandonment, which no arguments could overcome, or no advantages counterbalance. Some of this feeling is unavoidable, from the fact that any Capital in Canada must be at a great distance from the extremities of the Province, and those at a distance from the scene of Legislative deliberation and Executive action, will always imagine their interests more or less overlooked or their opinions slighted; but dissatisfaction of this nature must be very much aggravated if Legislation be carried on in a locality where neither the language, laws, or manners of a large portion of the community prevail, or are known, and where the actual condition and requirements of that part of the population cannot be observed, and can only be learned upon statements liable to be denied or controverted. Could no common locality be found, on ground equal, or nearly so, to both parties, a great obstacle would be offered to the success of the measure of the Union—for the Committee think that one or the other party would continue discontented, and would suffer under a sense of injustice and oppression, most injurious to the Government, and inimical to the tranquility of the Province. To find the place which leaves the least foundation for complaint on any side, has therefore been the object of the Com-

mittee of the Council in the present enquiry, and it is one which, they think, ought to be paramount to all others.

Quebec, it is true, has its fortifications ; it is the mart of the Timber Trade, in which a portion of the people of Upper Canada are concerned ; it has Houses of Parliament already constructed, which might temporarily answer for the meeting of the Legislature, and part of which would serve the same purpose in future ; and it is not materially different in climate from most other parts of the Province. But its distance from Upper Canada, its want of equal commercial connection with the Upper Province, except as regards one branch of trade, the little personal common intercourse between its inhabitants and people from the western portion of the Colony, form, in the opinion of the Committee, strong objections to its being chosen as the Seat of Government. Upper Canadians having business to transact with Government, or who are engaged in public affairs, would feel themselves forced to go to a distance from their Country, to a place where everything would appear strange, and where even the distance from, and expense of communication with their own Section of the Province, would be considered unnecessary inflictions. Toronto, though a flourishing and rapidly rising City, situated in a fertile country, and having a large extent of territory in its rear, peopled, and in the course of settlement, has, nevertheless, little interests in common with the Lower Province, unless as a place through which its Commerce must pass. And its strangeness to Lower Canadians, would even be greater than would be felt in Quebec, by people from Upper Canada, while its distance from Eastern Canada would cause many and constant inconveniences, too great to admit the continuance of the Capital there. Kingston, it is true, is somewhat nearer to a central position, but its importance, except as a Military Post, depends mainly upon the forwarding trade, and, not having an improved back country, its progress has not been rapid, notwithstanding its being one of the most ancient Towns in the Province, and favoured by the presence of large Naval and Military establishments. The coming of the Government caused improvements, which, however, must be limited to the wants of the influx population consequent upon that occasion. It is close upon the American frontier ; many of its supplies are taken from the United States, and the inhabitant of Lower Canada feels himself alienated from his own people as much in this City as he could well be any where in Canada ; while it is not a place in which any considerable number of the inhabitants of Upper Canada, besides its own citizens and the coun-

try in its neighborhood, have any interest. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the question was discussed, in the two last Sessions, in the Legislative Assembly, a very large majority of Members declared decidedly against Kingston. Of Bytown, it may be said that it is comparatively safe from attack in the interior; that when the country of the Ottawa comes to be settled, it promises to rise into importance, and that it is situate on the Provincial Boundary, but then its position makes it inconvenient both for Upper and Lower Canadians; it is, in fact, out of the way of both; and thus possessing disadvantages which would be equally felt by both divisions of the Province, it would, probably, unite both in one feeling, and that not its favor.

The Island of Montreal was chosen as the site of a great City, by the French Government, in the early times of the Colony. In making this choice, the acknowledged sagacity and foresight displayed by the Officers of that Nation, in their selection of positions, for either Civil or Military occupation, along the course of the Saint Lawrence and down the Mississippi, in a country then a forest wilderness was scarcely required, when Montreal was designated as a future City. No discoveries of localities claiming to be equal, no developement of the vast resources of later times, no improvement in Canal navigation, and not even the discovery and use of steam (which, in other instances, have set at naught the calculations of the wisest and most profound of early politicians,) have made any change in the prospect of importance to Montreal, except as they have confirmed and advanced all prognostications of its future greatness. Situate at the head of navigation from the Sea, and at the foot of the River and Canal navigation, not only of Canada but of North Western America, Montreal has long been the Commercial Capital of the Province, and bids fair to be the Mart of Commerce of a large portion of the vast North Western country of the American States. It is not merely a City through or by which the Commerce of the country passes, but it is the depot and place of exchange of that Commerce, and, consequently, it is, beyond all comparison, the centre of the wealth of Canada, a wealth, not derived from any partial or changeable source, but flowing to it alike from the Atlantic, from the distant Western Lakes, and even from waters whose natural outlet is to be found at New Orleans, but which, by means of Canals, have been made to communicate with the Canadian Lakes, and to bring contributions to the favoured City of Canada. Ships from the Ocean and Vessels from the interior, lie together in the Port, and men from all

quarters meet there in the ordinary course of business. Montreal has no concern in the sectional jealousies of the different positions in the Western Canada, but it is impossible to imagine an improvement in the condition of that country, by which that City is not benefitted, while, on the other hand, the Upper Canadians having little to do with the affairs of the other Ports of Lower Canada, have a deep interest in Montreal, as their own Sea Port and their own market; Montreal is, therefore, essentially a City of both the late Provinces: one in which each claim an interest, and it is, moreover, a City familiar to Upper Canadians as it is to the inhabitants of the section of which it forms a part; it is the place, of all others, in which to study the statistics and politics of the whole of Canada,—in which there is the least chance of partial Legislation, or of the interests of any part of the people of the Province, being overlooked or disregarded.

There can be no stronger proof of the correctness of these opinions than the claim set up by the inhabitants of the Western Country long before the Union, to the City of Montreal, as a place built up with the result of their industry, and sustained by their Commerce; but of the resources arising from the wealth of which they were deprived, in consequence of that City forming part of a different province. That the lower Canadians resented and resisted a proposition for the dismemberment of their Country and the loss of their chief City, is undoubted, and surely this contest for a place in which both claimed a deep and obvious interest, shared by no other locality, ought to be conclusive evidence in favor of the disputed position, when the inquiry is made where shall be the United Capital of these contending Provinces? That the Capital of the United Provinces ought to be placed in the position, which would enable Upper Canadians most effectually to look after the concerns of their own seaborne and outward trade, and in the place in which Lower Canadians can most effectually investigate and control the internal management of communications, of which they share the expense, and in the advantages of which they expect to share, appears to the Committee of Council almost an indisputable proposition. That Montreal possesses these advantages is not to be disputed, and that there are facilities afforded to a Government resident in Montreal, of closely and constantly ascertaining what is for the public advantage of the whole community, and what is the true bent of public opinion, superior to any offered by rival Cities claiming the choice of the Government, the Committee think is equally apparent. All the

advantages of common and universal interest in one locality are, in the opinion of the Committee, found in Montreal in a superior degree, to those existing in most Capital Cities, and therefore they feel bound, without giving much weight to local claims, or to desires naturally entertained of political preponderance in either section of the Province, to tender to your Excellency their respectful advice, to recommend to the Queen the choice of Montreal, as Her Majesty's Canadian Capital.

The Committee further beg leave to suggest, that although it is for Her Majesty to declare Her Gracious pleasure upon this subject, yet, in whatever place the Seat of Government shall be fixed, heavy expenses will attend its establishment, which have to come through the vote of the Legislature, and they have no doubt but that it would be gratifying to Her Majesty, as it would to Your Excellency and Council, to see the necessary expenditure cheerfully and cordially undertaken, and borne by the Provincial Parliament. And the Committee need not say how much it would mortify them to see any serious difference of opinion in the Legislature, on such a point. The proceedings in the two last Sessions of Parliament would, the Committee apprehend, indicate such a difficulty, to an extent, which would make application to Parliament almost hopeless, were Kingston to be continued, or any of the places which put forward their own claims, chosen; and they are of opinion that although the Citizens of Montreal appear to take little interest in the question, as they might be personally affected by its decision, and although in fact that City is so full of other resources, as to account for the indifference of its inhabitants, to the acquisition of the character of a Political Capital, yet the advantages to the Public generally appear so plain, and the general objects in view in the choice so defensible, that they have the strongest hope of a concurrence in the selection by the Legislature, and of the avoidance of the difficulties which any other would probably occasion. In favor of which soever place Her Majesty may please to decide, the Committee of Council would respectfully suggest, that the interests of individuals are suffering, and will continue to suffer, by any delay in the final decision. The popular mind is also kept more or less unsettled and agitated on the question, so as to effect other politics injuriously. When once the Provincial Capital is definitively chosen, bad feeling on the subject will cease, and common favorable interests will be awakened. The more quickly the intention of Her Majesty shall be carried into execution, the sooner will its beneficial objects be understood and admitted.

And should your Excellency be pleased to agree in the recommendation of the Committee, and should Her Majesty be advised to concur in the measure of fixing the Capital at Montreal, the Committee think that facilities for a very early removal of the Government thither can be found in that City, and the accommodation offered by its extent and position, as well as by the possession of public property there, available for the uses of the Government.

The urgent necessity for an immediate decision and for early action thereupon, is further shewn by the approaching want of funds to pay the rents of the Public Buildings and the Government House occupied in Kingston. An application to Parliament for those funds would bring on the question respecting the Seat of Government in its most embarrassing shape. The buildings occupied for Public Offices and for Parliament in Kingston, are, moreover, totally unfit for the purpose to which they are temporarily turned. The Members of the Legislature have been put to the greatest inconvenience for the want of a tolerable building in which to hold their Sessions, and facilities for the erection of buildings in Montreal and the superior cheapness of their construction at that place, give it advantages, in an economical point of view, which would more than counterbalance the value of any Public Edifices that exist either in Quebec or Toronto.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

By order,

Signed,

R. B. SULLIVAN,

Chairman.

Certified,

E. PARENT, C. E. C.

COUNCIL CHAMBER, }
Kingston, 16th March, 1843. }

If any reasons require to be added to those so ably stated in the preceding Report, why Montreal should be selected as the Seat of Government, from a regard both to the present and future welfare of the Province, and the advancement of its interests, socially, politically, and nationally, the following may with propriety and confidence be urged:—

THE CENTRAL POSITION OF THE CITY.

It is as nearly equidistant as possible from the Eastern and Western extremities of the Province. Gaspé, the extreme East, lies in the vicinity of the 63rd degree of longitude. Montreal, the centre, in about the 73rd. Sandwich, the extreme West, in close proximity to the 83rd. On the North, the settled country extends as yet but a short distance from Montreal. On the South, the United States' Boundary Line lies at a distance of about fifty miles from it.

THE FACILITIES OF ACCESS TO THE CITY BY SEA AND INLAND NAVIGATION.

Montreal lies at the head of Ship Navigation. By the deepening of Lake St. Peter—which, though a Provincial undertaking, Montreal is now effecting, and has nearly completed, at her own cost—Ships of War of almost any magnitude are able to anchor in her Ports; whilst, by means of the vast Lakes, the noble St. Lawrence, and the magnificent Canals above the City, Vessels capable of loading 3,000 barrels of Flour can descend to Montreal from the Far West without breaking bulk.

THE RAILROAD INTER-COMMUNICATION OF THE CITY.

The Grand Trunk Railway Company have their principal Dépôts, at Point St. Charles, in this City. The Grand Trunk Railroad is already completed to St. Thomas, below Quebec, and to Toronto, in Upper Canada; it also extends to the seaboard in Portland. The Victoria Bridge—which, when finished, will span the St. Lawrence at Montreal, at a breadth of about two miles, and may be justly classed amongst the wonders of the age—will complete the link on the Grand Trunk Railway, connecting the Eastern and the Western extremities of the Province; and it is fervently hoped by all Canadians, (but by none more earnestly and enthusiastically than by the Citizens of Montreal), that this

great achievement of Engineering science and skill, will, when perfected, be opened by Her Most Gracious Majesty in person.

As the main artery of Railroad intercourse in Canada, the Grand Trunk will ultimately extend from Montreal, as its centre, not merely to the extremities of the Province East and West, but unite with the Railroads in progress in the Lower Provinces, and otherwise branch off from Montreal into numerous radiations. It already links Montreal to Quebec at Point Levi, on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, and will, in all probability, at no very distant day, connect Quebec with Montreal by the North shore, and extend along the banks of that noble tributary, the Ottawa, even as far as the Georgian Bay in the West.

MONTREAL IS THE COMMERCIAL EMPORIUM OF CANADA,

And the centre of extensive Manufacturing interests.

Our Upper Canadian friends and those intelligent American Citizens, who honored us with their presence at the memorable celebration of the opening, in Montreal, in November last, of the Grand Trunk Railway, conceded these facts, and complimented us on their advantages. It is hither the masses of the Upper Canadian Merchants come to purchase their supplies of merchandise, imported from Great Britain and Foreign Ports. It is here that, from the magnitude of our commerce, and the extent of our commercial relations, the Legislature, during its Session, could best obtain the greatest diversity of public opinion affecting the commercial interests of the whole Province. This remark would equally apply to the manufacturing interests. Montreal is the seat and centre of extensive Manufactories, from which all parts of the Province, to some extent, draw their supplies; and commands within herself an immense hydraulic power, lying, as she does, on the banks of the St. Lawrence, whose rapids above the City furnish her with an inexhaustible supply of water for mill seats and manufacturing purposes. Of this power, she has al-

ready largely availed herself, by establishing extensive and costly Manufactories on the banks of the Lachine Canal, at Montreal.

HER POPULATION—ITS NUMBERS AND MIXED CHARACTER.

The population of Montreal, now more than 75,000, and probably amounting to 80,000 in number, greatly exceeds that of any other City in Canada. Besides being the most populous City, Montreal receives throughout the year the largest number of transient visits from persons residing in various parts of the Province; and thus, in fact, possesses, at all times, within herself, the greatest amount of public opinion affecting every interest of a nature to be legislated upon; available on the spot, at all times, to the Members of the Executive Government, and to Parliament when in Session. This is in itself of much importance; but the mixed character of her population is of infinitely greater. Composed, as the population of United Canada is well known to be, of the descendants of different nationalities, speaking different languages, and, to some extent, yet retaining their national peculiarities,—the French predominating in Lower, the English in Upper Canada,—the population of Montreal is, happily for the interests of both races, nearly almost equally divided in number, between Franco and Anglo-Canadians, or the descendants of the two races—the numbers of the latter, rather predominating over those of the former. The City of Montreal, consequently, affords to each race the greatest possible facility for acquiring a knowledge of the language, habits, and feelings of the other; and that these facilities are readily and extensively availed of, by both races, is manifest from the fact, that both languages are correctly and familiarly spoken by nearly all the inhabitants of the City. If due regard, therefore, be paid to the dearest, the most sacred rights and interests of all Her Majesty's Canadian subjects, no other place so fitting as Montreal can be selected for the permanent Seat of Government in Canada. The harmonious working together of both nationalities, for their com-

*x. By the Census Act. was it was in 1852 — 57,715
and in 1861 — 91,006.
Increase in 9 years, — 33,291.*

mon good, will be more readily secured, by assembling the Members of the Legislature together in Montreal, where both languages are equally and generally used, than by calling them together in any other City of Canada, where only one of these languages is spoken or understood.

The opportunities afforded to the Members of the Legislature, in Montreal, for social intercourse with its intelligent and cultivated Citizens, of both origins, will tend more than any other means to extinguish those national antipathies and prejudices from which Canada has already suffered so much; and such harmonious intercourse will, no doubt, produce those feelings of mutual forbearance, good will and esteem for each other, so necessary to the welfare and advancement of both races.

THE PROGRESS OF MONTREAL IN LITERATURE, SCIENCE AND THE FINE ARTS.

In these certain evidences of civilization, Montreal lays claim to no very marked superiority over other Cities; but a large and liberal spirit pervades her Citizens; and if she cannot boast of extensive literary or scientific reputation, she has certainly not been niggard in the promotion of Science and the Fine Arts; in cultivating a taste for Literature; and endowing Institutions of Learning. The High School, the University of McGill College, the Natural History Society, the Canadian Institute, the Mercantile Library Association, the Mechanics' Institute, and the Geological Museum may all be referred to, with confidence, as honorable and gratifying results of her Literary and Scientific progress. And the fact that the American Association for the advancement of Science has honored Montreal, by selecting her as the favored City in which they will hold their Anniversary Meeting this year, testifies to the estimation in which her claims to consideration, on the score of Science and Literature, are held by that eminently scientific and erudite body.

HER POSITION FOR MILITARY DEFENCE.

In a recent communication to one of our City papers (Appendix 'A.', to which attention is most respectfully solicited) a competent Military authority has shewn that Montreal possesses the greatest possible natural advantages for Military defence, and that by means of the lofty Mountain which overshadows the City and River at its base, and which has most judiciously been named "the Royal Mount," and by means also of the Island of St. Helens, and the Nuns' Island, commanding the channel of the River above, below, and opposite to the City, Montreal can easily and at a comparatively trifling cost, be made impregnable to hostile attacks. If defended on the modern European system, as illustrated at Coblenz on the Rhine, and Lentz on the Danube, and still more recently in the immense external fortifications of Paris—but at the same time, in a more inexpensive and simple way—by a series of detached works, scientifically designed to strengthen a *naturally strong position*, and by that class of impromptu intrenchments which late events have shewn to be "the cheap defences of nations," Montreal may be defended not only until succour comes, but may be made so formidable as greatly to deter an enemy from coming at all.

Montreal of 1857 is not the Montreal of 1775, when Montgomery marched into it, at the head of a few thousand Continentals. The City then numbered less than 5,000 inhabitants; it now counts upwards of 75,000. It embraces within itself immense resources; the largest, best disciplined, and most effective Volunteer Force of all arms, Horse, Foot and Artillery, in Canada; and features in its material progress have imperceptibly added to its Military strength, since the period of the American Revolution.

The writer adverted to, most correctly observes that Montreal possesses two forresses of great natural strength, in its well known "Mount Royal," and in the Island of St. Helens. The "Mount Royal," or Mountain of Montreal, immediately in the rear of the City, forms the apex of a defensible triangle, of

which the River St. Lawrence forms the base. One foot of the triangle is planted on the Island of St. Helens; the other on the Island of St. Paul, commonly known as the Nuns' Island. This outline embraces the system of an inexpensive, but secure, defence. The Mountain of Montreal consists in reality of a nest of hills, each, in a defensive point of view, bearing upon, but independent of the other. They abound in wood and water, and offer convenient and safe accommodation for troops. As a whole, with the employment of skill and labor in the improvement of natural advantages, the Mountain may be made impregnable. So long as the Mountain is held in force, no enemy can safely assail the flanks of the triangle—the Eastern and Western defences of the Town; and it is, therefore, impossible under these circumstances, that the Town can ever be taken.

Many other and most cogent reasons might be added to the foregoing, why Montreal should be selected as the Seat of Government; but the length to which this document has extended would cause their enumeration to be tedious; and the force and weight of the arguments submitted, render any further reasons supererogatory.

In the name, therefore, of the City Authorities of Montreal, I will conclude this document, by repeating in the candid and unanswerable language of the late Honorable Mr. Sullivan's Report, as incontrovertible reason why the Seat of Government should be established here: That Montreal is essentially a City of both the late Provinces of Canada—the Upper and the Lower; one in which each claims an interest; and it is moreover a City as familiar to Upper Canadians as it is to the inhabitants of the section of which it forms a part; it is the place of all others in which to study the statistics and politics of the whole of Canada—in which there is the least chance of partial legislation or of the interests of any part of the people of the Province being overlooked or disregarded. There can be no stronger proof of the correctness of these opinions than the claim set up by the inhabitants of the Western country, long before the Union, to the

City of Montreal as a place, built up with the result of their industry, and sustained by their commerce, but of the resources arising from the wealth of which they were deprived in consequence of the City forming part of a different Province. That the Lower Canadians resented and resisted a proposition for the dismemberment of their country, and the loss of their chief City, is undoubted; and surely this contest for a place in which both claimed a deep and obvious interest, shared by no other locality, ought to be conclusive evidence in favor of the disputed position, when the inquiry is made: "Where shall be the United Capital of these contending Provinces?" That the Capital of the United Provinces ought to be placed in the position which would enable Upper Canadians most effectually to look after the concerns of their own sea-borne and outward trade, and in the place where Lower Canadians can most effectually investigate and control the internal management of communications of which they share the expense, and in the advantages of which they expect to share, is as indisputable a proposition now, as it was when first enunciated by the Committee of the Council, and afterwards confirmed by the Legislature of the Province, in 1843. That Montreal possesses these advantages is not to be disputed, and that there are facilities afforded to a Government resident in Montreal, of closely and constantly ascertaining what is for the public advantage of the whole community, and what is the true bent of public opinion, superior to any offered by rival Cities, claiming the choice of the Government, is equally apparent. All the advantages of common and universal interest in one locality are found in Montreal, in a superior degree to those existing in most Capital Cities; and, therefore, every disinterested and upright Canadian, every true patriot and lover of his country feels a confident expectation that Her Most Gracious Majesty, without giving much weight to local claims, or to desires naturally entertained of political preponderance in either section of the Province, will make choice of *Montreal* as Her Majesty's Canadian Capital.

The whole most respectfully submitted.

Signed,

HY. STARNES,

(L.S.)

Mayor.

Countersigned,

J. P. SEXTON,

City Clerk.



APPENDIX A.

Extracted from the "Montreal Gazette," of Wednesday, 29th April, 1857.

THE DEFENCE OF MONTREAL.

(From a Correspondent.)

* * * * "But, in case of a war now, we should be differently situated. I have been informed by one of their Engineers that they would land an army on our side, and take possession of some place susceptible of being strongly fortified, and cut off the communication between Upper and Lower Canada."—*An Old Soldier of 1812*,"—*Cor. of Montreal Gazette*.

No General in his senses would dream of making the attempt, unless he had previously conquered Montreal and established there his base of operations against the remainder of the Province, both Upper and Lower. It is accordingly in the direction of Montreal, that Invasion is to be looked for, that is not only the shortest line, but is the line of least resistance, and any military man is aware that if such a movement were attempted, as it would be, by a force commensurate to the undertaking, resistance and defence of Montreal would be perfectly hopeless, and would but expose that large, populous, wealthy and spirited city to utter and useless destruction. For all these reasons then no military man could come to any other conclusion, that on political and strategical ground, there cannot be the slightest hesitation in awarding the preference for the Seat of Government to Quebec.—*Quebec Military Gazette, March 14.*

1. It is a matter of some importance to the inhabitants of this great and rapidly increasing city to inquire whether, under circumstances which have occurred before, and which may occur again,

Montreal must necessarily be abandoned to the mercies of a "buccaneering invader," or whether by forethought and precaution, and some little preparation, such an invader may not be kept at bay, until the arrival of succour from without.

2. Nothing encourages a defence so much as the knowledge how defence can be made ; nothing daunts an assailant more than the knowledge that resistance will be encountered.

3. It has been urged against Montreal, as its only disqualification as the seat of General Government of the Province, that it is defenceless and incapable of defence ; and the assertion undisputed and unrefuted thus far, has assumed in some quarters the character of truth. It may be as well to investigate the correctness of these conclusions. Is Montreal incapable of defence against a *coup de main*, even with the means at the disposal of the country ? Is it indefensible in a great national and protracted war, when backed by the mighty power of England ?

4. It is not pretended that Montreal is to be defended—à *la mode de Monsieurs de Vauban*,—on the old European system, when a mediæval town, a dense conglomeration of houses, is fenced in by a tight fitting wall, where half the shots fired miss the soldiers and maul the citizens ; where, after a short experience of such discipline, the citizens politely inform the soldiers that they have either to give up or be given up, forcing, in short, the defenders "*a battre la chamade*," as has been exemplified on the Continent of Europe a hundred times within the last hundred years, —but on the modern European or German system, as illustrated at Coblenz on the Rhine, and Lintz on the Danube, and still more recently in the immense external fortifications of Paris ; but at the same time in a more inexpensive and simple way—by a series of detached works, scientifically designed to strengthen a naturally strong position, and by that class of impromptu intrenchments, which late events have shown to be "the cheap defence of nations," it is contended that Montreal may be defended not only until succour comes, but may be made so formidable, as greatly to deter an enemy from coming at all. Defences such as these also afford the strongest incentive to courageous exertion. Covering the place they are projected to defend, they keep the assailants at a safe distance, and carry with them the protection, and not the destruction of the families and properties of the defenders.

5. Montreal of 1857, is not the Montreal of 1775, when Montgomery marched into it at the head of a few hundred Continentals. Montreal then numbered 5,000 inhabitants ; it now

counts 75,000. It embraces within itself immense resources, and features in its material progress have imperceptibly added to its military strength.

6. Montreal, if assailed at all, will be assailed by the forces of the United States. To reach it they must cross the River St. Lawrence, and establish themselves on the Island of Montreal, with a due regard to the security of their communications.

7. To secure a passage on to the Island of Montreal, at any point, it must be made in the summer months, between the 1st May and the 1st December. From the 1st December to the 15th January, and from the 15th to the 30th April, the St. Lawrence is, on the usual average, impassable, except in canoes, and even then with difficulty and danger. From the 15th January to the 15th April, the climate is the best defence of the country. Those who have witnessed the unopposed advance of a few hundred troops and their *impedimenta* through the narrow snow roads and high-piled ice fields of Canada can appreciate its importance.

8. In the summer months, so long as the Islands at Sorel are occupied and Quebec maintained, no American force could cross the St. Lawrence below St. Helen's Island, except in the face of the steamers and gun-boats of England.

9. To the Sorel Islands and Quebec should be added the point known on the St. Lawrence as the "Plata" at the Richelieu Rapids.

10. From the mouth of the Lachine Canal—14 miles above the City of Montreal to the Island of St. Helens—the River St. Lawrence is impassable in the face of resistance. From the mouth of the Lachine Canal to the head of the Lachine Rapids, a distance of about six miles, the attempt to cross the river, if made at all, must be made in row boats,—the landing at least must be so effected,—and the larger the vessel employed the greater would be the danger to the assailants. A few light troop, and light artillery would foil any such attempt. It is to be held in mind that any vessel disabled at this point would inevitably be carried over the Lachine Rapids to certain destruction, and that the river is too wide, too deep, and too rapid to be bridged by any process known to military engineering, in the face of resistance.

11. From the head of the Lachine Rapids to the Island of St. Helens the passage of the river presents equal, if not greater obstacles. Presuming an enemy's force to be in unmolested possession of the most favorable point of attack on the South of the St. Lawrence, that is to say, in occupation of the Town of La Prairie, situated, in a deep embayment of the river, about two

miles below the Lachine Rapids, and at a distance of about seven miles from Montreal. All means of transportation will have been removed; but it may be supposed that boats have been brought, and steam gun-boats built on the coast, in defiance of the British steam navy, which, it must be confessed, would have some difficulty in navigating the channel,—in one place narrow and rocky, in another wide and shallow, intricate in all,—but, admitting the enemy to be in possession of steam gun-boats, and to attempt a descent on the City, a few scows laden with stone and sunk in the narrow steamboat channel opposite to St. Lambert, with a battery at the lower end of Nuns' Island, combined with the fire of St. Helen's Island, would effectually frustrate any such attempt; for, as has been above stated, the navigable channel above this point is narrow and intricate,—the shore of the Island of Montreal, above Nuns' Island is rendered inaccessible, by rocks and rapids, and the coast of the latter Island unapproachable, except in row boats, by reason of the shallowness of the water.

12. It is presumed, of course, that the Island of St. Helens will be held as at present, properly fortified and occupied. While so occupied, no hostile force can approach the City, by river, from below; still less could any invading force cross the St. Lawrence under fire of its guns above.

13. Any enemy therefore, on the South of the St. Lawrence, at Laprairie, and in its vicinity, if still resolved to attack Montreal on the river front, would be reduced to attempt a descent on Nuns' Island. The occupation of Nuns' Island would endanger the City, because the City could be shelled from thence; but the approaches to Nuns' Island are for a long distance shallow, and could only be made in batteaux and open boats. The river, at this point, is too wide to be affected by a cannonade from the opposite shore. Gun boats, if constructed, could not manœuvre near enough to cover a debarkation, nor indeed, manœuvre at all in such a channel, within the range of red hot shot.

14. With Nuns' Island and the Island of St. Helens properly occupied, it is believed that the river front of the City of Montreal is unassailable.

15. No mention has been made of the Victoria Bridge, thus far, not because it has been lost sight of, but because things are spoken of as they now are. It is clear, however, that this bridge, when constructed with a sufficient *tete du pont* at its Southern extremity, will not only aid the defence of the city, but will afford an invaluable means of defence to the defenders.

16. If, therefore, it may be admitted, that Montreal is unassailable on its front; if it would be impossible to cross the river St. Lawrence in the teeth of the Navy of England below the city, it remains now to consider the manner in which an enemy would effect or might attempt a descent on the Island above the City of Montreal.

17. It has been shown that, in this direction, Montreal can not be approached below the mouth of the Lachine Canal. An attack from above presents fewer difficulties, though many of a serious nature remain to be grappled with. The line of the Ogdenburgh Railroad affords great facility for the concentration of troops and supplies, and an advance in force from the Beauharnois frontier on the village of Beauharnois would answer more objects than one. The occupation, however, of Lake St. Louis by a flotilla of gun-boats would most probably compel an enemy to cross the St. Lawrence, at a much higher point, resisted as a matter of course, and if successful, descend upon the City of Montreal, upon its western and northern fronts, from the upper end of the Island.

18. Admitting therefore an enemy to have attained this point, whether from Beauharnois, or from some point above. Supposing his outposts to be established at St Ann's, Point Claire, and St. Laurent, and his communications safe, the more distant his point of crossing the St. Lawrence the greater will be his difficulty. Supposing all this to have been effected, let us next consider his immediate approach to the City of Montreal, and how it may be met.

19. His direct line of advance would most naturally be on the western front of the city, on some part or parts of a line drawn from Monklands on the Mountain, to the mouth of the River St. Pierre, by the Lower Lachine Road, the Tanneries and the Cote St. Antoine.

20. The distance on this line, from Monklands to the mouth of the River St. Pierre is about three miles; the village of "The Tanneries" at the foot of the Tannery Hill, is about two miles from the mouth of St. Pierre. The intervening tract of land is with little exception a redeemed swamp. It has been before said, with reference to the progress of Montreal, that "features in its material progress had imperceptibly added to its military strength" The construction of the Lachine Canal and the completion of the Montreal Aqueduct afford the means of submerging the whole of this intervening tract of land, and of converting, in a few hours, the whole space between the foot of the Tannery Hill, and the mouth of the St. Pierre into an impassable morass. It would

only be doing that artificially and designedly, which occurs from natural causes or accidentally, every Autumn and Spring. This use of this important auxiliary is well known to those familiar with the Fortresses of the Pays Bas, and the north east of France. Further details might be given of the manner of carrying out this device, but enough has been said to show that, by means of inundation, with very little assistance from a warlike population, an enemy may be arrested at this point, far out of cannon shot of the city.

21. Foiled on the lower level, the enemy would next naturally renew his attempt on the space intervening between the top of the Tannery Hill and Monklands; by the *Cote St. Antoine*, in fact. This part of the line is about a mile in length. Here much is due to natural strength of position. The slope upwards to the Mountain ascends in terraces or *plateaux*, each commanding the one below, the Mountain crowning the whole. This part of the line could be easily and strongly intrenched, more especially on the spur of the Mountain. It is not pretended to interfere with the details of construction of these works, which must be left to the professional Engineers; but it is evident, from the "lay" of the ground, that three detached field works might be placed so as to command and flank each other; and, the highest being the strongest—even admitting that one of the lower works fell—no advance could be made on the Town, except under an overwhelming fire from the works and the Mountain above; it would be necessary to reduce all these works before an enemy could safely approach the City upon their front.

22. Counting the cost, he would naturally turn his attention further North. Now it may safely be asserted that the whole rear of the Mountain of Montreal, round from Monklands to Mile-end, may, with little comparative trouble or expense, be made impregnable. The rocks, where they are not precipitous, could be easily scarped, and the timber, with which the Mountain is covered, affords ready material for *abattis*. It is believed that no enemy would willingly attempt to force a position such as this properly defended.

23. To the East and North of Mile-End is Logan's Farm—military property, and destined as the site of future barracks for the garrison of Montreal. This should be made a regular and permanently fortified cantonment—a work which would require regular approaches and weeks of open trenches to subdue. It is not likely that this would prove an attractive alternative to the enemy, and he would probably move still farther on, and

find the weakest part of the whole circuit to lie between Logan's Farm and the Montreal Gaol, and the guns of St. Helens. Weak as it may appear, it can be made strong enough to keep him occupied, to his own ultimate discomfiture; for the effect of this movement would be to place Montreal and its forces between himself, his supplies, and communications, and to expose his flank and rear to harrassing attacks from the Ottawa country, the fleets on the St. Lawrence, and a relieving army from Quebec.

24. The practical effect of this system of defence would be to force an enemy, in vulgar parlance, "to take the bull by the horns"—either to approach the City between Monklands and the "Tannery Hill," where the only assailable front would be the strongest, or to assail the weaker front, on the East, at disadvantage, and remote from his resources. In the one case, the defence would be based on our own strength, in the other, on his weakness.

25. The cantonments of the reserved defending force would occupy the slopes of the Mountain on the Cote St. Antoine, Priests' Farm, and in the rear of Sherbrooke Street, in a healthy situation well supplied with water, central, and almost equidistant from all points of attack. From the heights above, the whole circumference of attack would be under the eye of the General in command.

26. If the views hereinbefore expressed have any just foundation, Montreal, with its present garrison, and by the help of its own citizens, is safe against a mere "buccaneering expedition" or *coup de main*.

27. But the object of this whole system of defence is to show that Montreal, if in a defensible state, must be assailed in a formal way, with all the preparations and premonitions of regular and civilized warfare. We are not to suppose that Canada will ever be involved in any war but one of self-defence, in which she would have the full support of England. Before the United States could concentrate an army on any point of the Frontier, the fleets of England would be upon the Atlantic seaboard, and her troops would occupy every defensible position on the St. Lawrence.

28. But supposing a conjuncture to arise which would have the effect of retarding the assistance of England, could Montreal be held by the resources of the country until assistance came? To this question it is answered, yes, provided that precautions are taken in time. Canada is, doubtless, unequal to a protracted struggle with a gigantic power like the United States,

but at the first outbreak of a war, the Militia of Canada, fighting on their own soil, would be quite equal, as in 1812, to the undisciplined and heterogeneous levies of the United States. An invasion attempted hastily and with such materials would undoubtedly fail. Disciplined soldiers require time to make, involve the costs and casualties of a great war, and delays which would survive the conjuncture above adverted to.

29. But if such an ill judged invasion should be attempted, is Montreal tenable until assistance comes? To this it is again answered, without hesitation, in the affirmative. Under such officers as we now have in the country, and with the aid of the troops at their disposal, the Volunteers and Militia of the country are quite sufficient to hold Montreal, if defended on the principles hereinbefore suggested, against any hasty and ill-provided attack. An ill-considered and ill-provided attack, such as this, is hardly to be apprehended. A more matured attack would be more maturely met, and as assuredly would be defeated.

30. But to secure this result under either contingency, no precaution should be omitted. Happily in the view herein taken of the subject it will cost little beyond precaution.

31. The militia rolls of Military Districts, Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, in the District of Montreal, Lower Canada, number 75,000 serviceable men. This return is believed to be under rather than over the real number. Of this number, 35,000 should be organized, and on occasion, might be made available for the defence of the city.

32. A plan of defence should be investigated, fully considered, and matured; the situation of the works necessary for defence decided upon; and in some, but very few cases, it might be necessary to acquire the land required for the purpose. In all cases, such land might remain in possession of the actual proprietors until wanted.

33. The means of arming detached field works and intrenchments, should be collected on a convenient central spot, accessible to and from them. It would be well to take advantage of winter roads and winter conveyances, and transport to, and "park" on, some elevated site of the Montreal Mountain, a few hundreds of the pieces of heavy iron ordnance now lying on St. Helens Island. From such a site it would be easy to move these ponderous masses *down* to their destination in the works, at a season of the year when it might be very difficult to remove them *up*. It might also be advisable to establish magazines and ammunition *depots* in some of the ravines or valleys in the upper

part of the Mountain, ready when required,—but at the same time in a position to cause little injury in the event of accidental explosion.

34. Precautions and preparations such as these, and many others which will suggest themselves, inspire confidence and give strength by showing how forces and resources can be most judiciously applied.

35. The application of these principles and means of defence, it is confidently believed, would not only secure Montreal from a sudden foray—from what the late Lord Ellesmere, in allusion to the Mexican war, was, in a lecture on America, pleased to call “rather a buccaneering sort of an expedition”—but would compel an enemy, abandoning all idea of a *coup de main*, to adopt a more deliberate, a more scientific, a more cumbrous and more expensive plan of invasion. To invest Montreal under the conditions above stated would require an army of 100,000 men. It would take 50,000 more to maintain its communications. Siege trains and six months’ “*munitions de guerre et de bouche*” for such a force, in our climate and country, are neither collected nor moved after the fashion of a buccaneering expedition.”

36. It has been justly said that in all great war, such as that must be which could boast of such an incident as the investment of Montreal, the purse is, in reality, the true arbiter of success. Armies are unavailing if not backed by a “*crumena non deficiente*.” To invade and invest Montreal, if properly defended, would demand not only a very large army, and an immense amount of supplies, but constant reinforcements. With a wide and rapid river on his flank and rear, not to be bridged by any process as yet known to military engineering, more especially in the face of resistance, an enemy would be perilously situated on the Island of Montreal. With a hostile population above, below and behind him—the City of Ottawa, a vast militia encampment, with its outposts in Glengarry and at St. Andrew’s—his communications would be continually interrupted, and his quarters continually beaten up. The cost of the necessary armaments, the expenditure of life and treasure, pitted against the resources of England and the desperation of Canada, would be well worthy of calculation even by the “all-mightiest people in creation,” or the Government of that people might, on trial, find itself in the extremity of a certain King of the Cappadocians,—“Though rich in niggers, was short of cash.”

37. It results from these observations:—

1st. That Montreal is unassailable, except from above.

2nd. That the assault from above involves difficulty, requires preparation, and is exposed to reverse.

3rd. That to invest the City of Montreal would demand an immense force.

4th. That it would be difficult to maintain the necessary communications of such a force.

5th. That the city, its buildings and population, would be out of reach of the fire of the besiegers.

6th. That the besiegers would very soon be themselves besieged.

7th. That discreet calculation would soon teach an enemy, "*Que le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle.*"

8th. That therefore it might be as well not to undertake the siege at all.

9th. That these results may be attained at once, and at no necessary expense beyond that of forethought and pre-arrangement.

10th. And that Montreal therefore is as defensible, and, for great national purposes, more worthy of defence than any City in North America.

38. "Forearmed, forewarned," or *vice versa*,—for the rule reads either way—Montreal may defy the worst. The precautions which would certainly encourage the defence, would as certainly discourage an attack, and these prudential considerations would not be diminished by the further reflection, that if Montreal is an assailable point, it is also a salient point; that if its defences were manned by its own inhabitants, so many thousands of British troops would be rendered available to operate diversions in the field; that an invasion of our Niagara or our Western frontier might be checkmated by a descent on the Hudson, on Troy, Albany and New York. The intermediate country is not the wilderness of 1777. It is now as fine a fighting country as any part of Flanders, and a second battle of Saratoga might reverse the story of the first.

Montreal, April 5th, 1857.

39. Little more than a passing allusion has been made, in the preceding paper to some of the most remarkable features in the defence of Montreal. It may be as well to bestow a few words upon them here. In the well known "Mount Royal," and in the Island of St. Helen, Montreal possesses two fortresses of great natural strength. The Mount Royal or Mountain of Montreal, immediately in the rear of the City, forms the apex of

a defensible triangle, of which the River St. Lawrence forms the base. One foot of the triangle is planted on the Island of St. Helen, the other on the Island of St. Paul, commonly known as the "Nuns' Island." This outline embraces the system herein-before projected. The Mountain of Montreal consists in reality of a nest of hills each, in a defensive point of view, bearing upon but independent of each other. They abound in wood and water, and offer convenient and safe accommodation for troops. As a whole, with the employment of skill and labor in the improvement of natural advantages, the Mountain may be made impregnable. There is but one point which, in the opinion of the writer, requires to be permanently fortified. This is probably the key of the position, and the necessary fortification, or rather rudiment of fortification, would cost but little. So long as the Mountain is held in force, no enemy can safely assail the flanks of the triangle, on the Eastern and Western defences of the Town. Even if they took the Town they could not hold it, but this is not the real consideration. The object of this paper is to show that the Town can not be taken at all.

40. The establishment of the so-called "Boulevard" round the upper *plateaux* of the Mountain would greatly aid this system of defence by providing easy means of communication, and for the concentration of troops on an inner circle of radiation, from whence they could be launched with effect on any part of the external circle of attack.

41. The strength and importance of the Island of St. Helen is well known. It is still a British garrison and arsenal. It commands the only navigable channel of the river, and all means of access to Montreal by water, from below. The channel which separates the Island from the south shore of the St. Lawrence is a boiling and impracticable rapid, which does not freeze in winter. The Island may be made impregnable. Until taken, the navigation of the river is effectually closed; and until taken, the Town, even if occupied by an enemy, could not be held.

42. A strong *tete du pont* at the Southern extremity of the Victoria Bridge, such as command the bridges on the Rhine, at Cologne and Mayence, would render the City unassailable from the river, because it would make the Southern bank of the river unassailable, until the *tete du pont* had been assaulted and subdued. No enemy could establish batteries on the South shore of the river, between the *tete du pont* and the Island of St. Helen, under the enfilading batteries of these works; and to establish

batteries above the *tête du pont*, and beyond the reach of its guns, would be to establish them out of reach of the City also.

43. Nuns' Island is naturally defended by the distance from the South shore of the St. Lawrence, its position at the foot of the rapids, and the shallow and impracticable character of its shore. It can only be approached by row boats. The disembarkation could not be covered by an effective fire of artillery, and would be counteracted by a few guns judiciously placed, with their fire directed *à fleur d'eau*.

44. There is just one other point which may be adverted to as conducing rather to the defence of Montreal than as forming part of the defences. A position, naturally strong, might be occupied and strengthened just below the Locks at Lachine, by a work of the character and dimensions of Fort Wellington at Ostend, which would not only cover the inundation and the source of the inundation, spoken of before, in paragraph 20, but which would expose an enemy assailing the Mountain and City of Montreal to be himself assailed in flank and rear. But, enough has been said to shew that Montreal is neither defenceless nor indefensible.

Montreal, April 12th, 1857.

One word more on the subject of the inundation by which it is proposed to cover the south western lower front of the city. It is believed that means might be devised, not only of securing a necessary inundation when required, but of holding in check the uncertain, casual and pernicious inundation, which almost periodically afflicts the lower parts of the city. Excavate a canal of the dimensions of the Lachine from opposite Brewster Basin to the mouth of the River St. Pierre, dam up the mouth of the river with sluices in the dam to regulate the flow of the water, form with the earth excavated a dyke on the lower or city side of the canal. This canal would become a dock as well as a wet ditch of the most formidable dimensions. The dyke would support stores, connected by tracks with the Grand Trunk depot. These stores, built as they are in Montreal, would be each a fortress. By raising the sluices at the dam, at the mouth of the River St. Pierre, not only would the water be raised to the highest level of the canal, but it might be forced to overflow the country intervening between the Canal and the Aqueduct, while the dyke would protect the town from the periodical inundations above alluded to.

Montreal, April 26th, 1857.